Abstract : The field of comparative economic studies has been adapting to the changing circumstances of recent decades, but prospects for the future of the subject merit discussion. The relationship between economic analysis of transition and comparative studies is reviewed. The development of comparative economic analyses of developing and established capitalist economies in "adjoining fields" of study is noted. Two major research issues for the future are put forward. A brief, pilot study of institutional influences on national business climate is described.
Introduction
What should we be comparing these days? I will start by looking back at the subject of com- began teaching courses in comparative economic systems at a time when the developed world was divided between two competing social and ideological systems, communism and capitalism.
Comparative Economic Systems was quite a popular undergraduate course -if any economics course can be popular -in the US. I started teaching it in Britain, at Birmingham University, in the 1970s. The usual undergraduate course was about countries. We could have studied companies as systems, but that was left to management specialists and others (e.g., Drucker, 1978) . We could have studied cities as economic systems but that was left to urban planners and social critics (e.g., Jacobs, 1985) . We did nations.
More precisely, we studied the consequences for the functioning of national economies of major differences in the institutional arrangements with which they operated. This is a behaviourist's definition: in other words, it is simply a summary of what we actually did, in research and teaching, under the heading of comparative economic systems, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. We did not usually address the causes of these institutional differences. There were occasional studies of, for example, the role of ideology in Soviet economic practice -which was one possible origin of a distinct set of institutions -but they were not a major part of the field. Economic histories of the USSR, say, or China might have a good deal tions, but we didn't label them Comparative Economic Studies.
Nor did we, by and large, address the question of how economic institutions changed over time. I think it is fair to say that we were engaged primarily in comparisons of sets of institutions that we treated as given: Economic Institutions Compared, to quote the title of a characteristically erudite and unconventional book by the late Peter
Wiles (Wiles, 1977) . A textbook by Neuberger and Duffy, Comparative Economic Systems: A Decision-making Approach (Neuberger and Duffy, 1976) , will serve to exemplify a more mainstream exposition of the subject: the authors classified economies, and then analysed their functioning, by reviewing their decision-making, information and motivation structures. They considered the implications of different structures for economic behaviour, and then looked at the outcomes in particular national economies. Institutions were then, and still are, fundamental to the subject. Let me therefore say at this stage what I understand by economic institutions .
Here I will follow Paul Hare, whose discussion of the subject is hard to improve on (Hare, 2001 (Sirc, 1979; Moore, 1980 American universities to the humble country-watcher, and so were government departments, think-tanks and some banks. But the university trend was strong. This intensification of economics as an academic subject has affected the ways in which comparative economic studies could be undertaken.
The subject has developed, I suggest, chiefly in response to real-world changes such as the collapse of communism and the apparent decline of some variants of capitalism, but also in response to changes in adjoining fields of study.
First, and most obviously, there was in 1990 a brand new subject: the economics of transition 2).
Then there was the study of economic institutions , coming chiefly from the study of economic history. Finally, from political economy, in works written mostly by people in political science departments, came another expanding field: the study of the "varieties of capitalism".
The economics of transition appears at first sight to be the successor discipline. It is, after all, a study of how nations (or societies, if you prefer) move from one kind of economic system to another. Is that not a natural extension of comparative economic studies? Would you not expect the country special ists-cum-comparativists to thrive as transitologists?
You would, but they haven't. For about a decade "transition" became a hot topic in economics.
It was a field in which new discoveries could be seat-of-the-pants experience conducting economic policy. We Soviet economic specialists have lost our monopoly and will have to compete with a growing number of such "interlopers" and "upstarts". (Millar, 1995, p. 232)
The consequences of the invasion from the main- Here is a country that we used to study because it had an economic system different from our own. Here is a study of that country now.
Therefore that study must come under the comparative economics heading. I doubt if that classification can survive once "we" depart from the scene -"we" being those in the profession who used to study countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and elsewhere when they had economic systems unlike our own. • Ease of doing business scores (World Bank).
• Corruption Perception Indices (Transparency International).
• Investment climate scores (Economist Intelligence Unit).
• For ex-communist countries alone: transition indicators (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).
• Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum).
I shall come back to these scores, rankings and indicators later. For the present, it is enough to note that, apart from the transition indicators, we have them, typically, for more than 150 countries, and they are potentially very useful for comparative economic studies. I say "potentially", because they should not be used uncritically; there are questions to be asked about their construction and meaning.
For the moment, the point to be made about these indicators is that the countries covered - Ledeneva, 2001; Rose, 1998) .
The last of the adjoining fields of study that I want to consider is the "varieties of capitalism", for which one basic reference is Hall and Soskice (2001) . I will not try to summarise the theory here but will simply take some of the classifications and predictions that emerge from it.
One key idea in the varieties of capitalism approach is that different capitalist countries can survive and thrive with somewhat different sets of social arrangements for coordinating production.
The main distinction is between liberal market economies and so-called "coordinated" market economies. The former approximates to the neo-classical model of a competitive economy.
Labour can be hired and fired fairly easily. There is a market for corporate control in the form of a large and liquid stock-market, and stock-market performance ("shareholder value") is very important for managerial decisions in quoted companies.
Other things equal, income inequality will tend to be high. The "coordinated" market economy operates with a greater element of strategic coopera- A good deal of work that is currently labelled "comparative economic studies" is wrongly put in that particular box out of inertia: it is so labelled (or, rather, it is discussed at conferences and published in journals that are so labelled) because it deals with countries that used to be communist On the surface at least, China seems to operate with a whole set of arrangements that was found not to work in Central Europe and the former So- The second issue is one that has been ad- The varieties-of-capitalism literature assumes that coordinated-market economies are viable and will continue to operate, that they are a set of institutions that will deliver employment and growth at rates acceptable to their populations in the future, as they have in the past. Dore chronicles the processes of change as they affect Germany and Japan. He suggests that those countries show a tendency to adapt towards shareholder (An-glo-Saxon, competitive-market) systems, under the pressure, in part, of the internationalization of capital markets. He considers this tendency to be likely, but not certain, to continue.
Sluggish output growth in Germany, France and Japan, together with the relatively high levels of unemployment in the first two of these countries, has dented confidence in Dore's "welfare capitalism" -capitalism with a human face, I
would call it. On the other hand, any idea that Anglo-Saxon shareholder capitalism provides the best of all possible worlds is just another utopian doctrine, and we ought to know by now how dangerous utopias are. Perhaps, since capitalism is an evolutionary process, evolution will leave just one species of capitalism standing. Perhaps not. (Table 2) . Good governance appears to have a highly positive effect on the business climate and redistributive arrangements a significant negative effect. 1) Jane Jacobs' argument that cities, city-regions, supply regions and stagnant regions (her terminology) are more useful units for study than are countries (Jacobs 1985 ) is a powerful and unfairly neglected view. It deserves extended discussion that would have to go beyond the bounds of this paper.
2) For reasons that have been well rehearsed by others, I consider the word "transformation" to be a more appropriate word for the enormous social and economic alterations involved in post-communist change. In fact, looking around the Commonwealth of Independent States, I would be inclined to prefer "post -communist mutation" to either "transition" or "transformation" . But "transition" is the term that is now entrenched in the literature. 
